Dec. 19, 2012 (LPAC)--The long-awaited State Department Accountability Review Board (ARB) report on the attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi is a coverup of Obama's alliance with Al-Qaeda in Libya and Syria. The unclassified document never once mentions the White House and never discusses the perpetrators of the attack on the mission. In this respect, the report states: "The key questions surrounding the identity, actions and motivations of the perpetrators remain to be determined by the ongoing criminal investigation."
The report acknowledges the presence of Al-Qaeda in the Benghazi area: "Jihadis from Benghazi engaged in Afghanistan against the Soviets and took up arms against U.S. forces in the post-2003 Iraq insurgency. Many of them reemerged in 2011 as leaders of anti-Qaddafi militias in eastern Libya." But then it claims that Al-Qaeda does not control or direct the militias: "The global terrorism threat as most often represented by al Qaeda is fragmenting and increasingly devolving to local affiliates and other actors who share many of AQ's aims -- without necessarily being organized or operated under direct AQ command and control."
What is left out entirely is that the opposition to Gaddafi, backed by the U.S., Britain, and Saudi Arabia, was dominated by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, which merged with al-Qaeda in 2007 and is designated by the U.S. State Department, the UK Home Office and the UN as a terrorist organization.
Ansar al-Sharia, the group widely identified as having launched the attack, which is run by Sufian bin Qumu, a member of Al-Qaeda and the LIFG, is never mentioned in the report.
The report does reveal important information about the February 17th Martyrs' Brigade, which was supposed to provide security for the mission, but the report never reveals that this group was organized by the emir of the Al-Qaeda affiliated LIFG Abel Hakim Belhadj, the commander of the Tripoli Military Council until the spring of 2012.
It refers to a "quasi-governmental militia," which it says facilitated the evacuation of the annex after it was attacked, but fails to report the name of the group, which is Libya Shield, the fact that it delayed the response team sent from Tripoli at the airport and then followed the team to the annex, and that within 15 minutes after their arrival the attack on the annex began.
The Libya Shield is headed by Wisam bin Hamid, who is widely identified as the head of Al-Qaeda in Libya and who met with U.S. officials on September 9.
The report describes the fact that an officer of the Supreme Security Council of Libya was observed taking pictures of the mission the morning of the attack and a marked police vehicle of the SSC, which was supposed to be stationed outside the mission 24/7, left just before the mission was attacked.
With respect to the February 17 Brigade, "The Board's inquiry found little evidence that the armed February 17 guards alerted Americans at the SMC to the attack or summoned a February 17 militia presence to assist expeditiously once the attack was in progress--despite the fact that February 17 members were paid to provide interior security and a quick reaction force for the SMC and the fact that February 17 barracks were in the close vicinity, less than 2 km away from the SMC. A small number of February 17 militia members arrived at Villa C nearly an hour after the attack began. Although some February 17 members assisted in efforts to search for Ambassador Stevens, the Board found little evidence that February 17 contributed meaningfully to the defense of the special mission compound, or to the evacuation to the airport that took place on the morning of September 12."
"There were some troubling indicators of the reliability [of the February 17 militia] in the months and weeks preceding the September attacks. At the time of Ambassador Stevens visit, February 17 militia members had stopped accompanying Special Mission vehicle movements in protest over salary and working hours."
The Board also found that no guards hired by the British Blue Mountain firm were "present outside the compound immediately before the attack ensued, although perimeter security was one of their responsibilities, and there is conflicting information as to whether they sounded any alarms prior to fleeing. In the final analysis, the Board could not determine exactly how the C1 gate at the Special Mission compound was breached, but the speed with which attackers entered raised the possibility that BML guards left the C1 pedestrian gate open after initially seeing the attackers and fleeing the vicinity."
The only other detail which the report discloses is that 30 minutes after Ambassador Stevens escorted a Turkish diplomat out of the mission, a UK security team supporting a day visit by British diplomats dropped off vehicles and equipment at the mission. When the UK security team departed there were no signs of anything unusual, including no roadblocks outside of the compound.
It was not previously known that UK diplomats had been in Benghazi that same day, since they had previously closed down their consulate in the city.
What the UK diplomatic personnel were doing in Benghazi is not known